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POISONING THE NEXT APPLE?
THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT AND
INDIVIDUAL INVENTORS
David S. Abrams*
R. Polk Wagner**
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the most significant patent law reform effort in two generations, may have a dark side: it seems likely to decrease
the patenting behavior of individual inventors, a category which occupies special
significance in American innovation history. In this Article, we empirically predict the effects of the major change in the law, which shifts the patent priority
rules from the United States’ traditional “first-to-invent” system to the internationally predominant “first-to-file” system. While there has been some theoretical
work on this topic, we use an analogous law change in Canada as a natural experiment to shed the first empirical light on the question.
Our analysis uses a difference-in-difference framework to estimate the impact of the Canadian law change on small inventors. Using data on all patents
granted by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, we find a significant drop in the share of patents granted to
individual inventors in Canada coincident with the implementation of a first-tofile system. We find no measurable changes in patent quality and perform several
additional analyses to rule out alternative explanations. While the net welfare
impact that can be expected from a shift to first-to-file is unclear, our results re-
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veal that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the March 2013 implementation
of a first-to-file rule in the United States is likely to result in a reduced share of
patents granted to individual inventors.

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 518
I. FIRST-TO-INVENT VERSUS FIRST-TO-FILE: A PRIMER ...................................... 523
A. First-to-Invent: U.S. and Canadian Approaches........................................ 524
B. First-to-File: U.S. and Canadian Approaches ........................................... 526
C. The Policy of Patent Priority Rules ............................................................ 528
II. RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................... 530
A. The Canadian Law Change ........................................................................ 532
B. Prior Literature on Priority Rules.............................................................. 533
C. Data Used in This Study ............................................................................. 536
III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .................................................................................. 544
A. The Rate of Patenting in the United States and Canada ............................ 544
B. The Effect of First-to-File: Individual Versus Corporate Inventors........... 546
C. Patent Quality Changes.............................................................................. 551
D. Addressing Potential Concerns and Robustness Tests ............................... 553
1. The contemporaneous patent term change .......................................... 553
2. The introduction of maintenance fees ................................................. 557
3. Deferred examination.......................................................................... 558
E. Interpretation and Analysis of Our Results ................................................ 559
1. Possible mechanisms ........................................................................... 560
2. Welfare implications ........................................................................... 562
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 563

INTRODUCTION
The garage inventor is an American icon. The image of the solitary genius
tinkering away in order to perfect her idea captures our imagination, and the
long line of world-changing inventors and their companies—from Thomas Edison (in Menlo Park, N.J. and West Orange, N.J.)1 to Bill Hewlett and David
Packard (in Palo Alto)2 to Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs (in Los Altos)3—only
confirms this uniquely American vision of innovation. The patent system works
hand in hand with this sense of the small inventor by providing those who have
little more than good ideas much-needed clout in the commercial marketplace.

1. See THOMAS A. MEYER, INNOVATE!: HOW GREAT COMPANIES GET STARTED IN
TERRIBLE TIMES 30-31, 36, 38 (2010) (explaining that Edison’s first invention resulted from
moonlighting after twelve-hour workdays as a telegraph operator for Western Union).
2. See ASHLEE VANCE, GEEK SILICON VALLEY: THE INSIDE GUIDE TO PALO ALTO,
STANFORD, MENLO PARK, MOUNTAIN VIEW, SANTA CLARA, SUNNYVALE, SAN JOSE, SAN
FRANCISCO 23-26 (2007) (describing the beginnings of the computer giant Hewlett-Packard
in a garage in Palo Alto).
3. See JAN GOLDBERG, CAREERS FOR HOMEBODIES & OTHER INDEPENDENT SOULS 17
(2d ed. 2007) (“Wozniak and Jobs designed what would be the Apple I in Jobs’s bedroom,
and they built the prototype in Jobs’s garage.”).
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Indeed, without the protection of inventions by the patent system, the world
might never have known General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, or Apple.4
On September 16, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA or the Act),5 almost certainly the most
sweeping set of changes to the U.S. patent system in almost sixty years.6 The
most important provision of the Act, and the subject of this Article, is the
change in the rules used to establish priority between competing inventors.7
Until March 16, 2013, the United States used a first-to-invent (FTI) priority
rule.8 This means that when there was a dispute as to patent priority, the party
that had the inventive idea first was entitled to the patent. This could be established by using lab notebooks, emails, and other documentation of the date of
invention. By contrast, a first-to-file (FTF) rule relies on the date (and possibly
4. For a critique of this idea, see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110
MICH. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (2012) (“The canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely
a myth. . . . Invention appears in significant part to be a social, not an individual, phenomenon.”).
5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(amending scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
6. The 1952 Patent Act was the last major reform of the patent system. See Jason
Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Commentary, Toward a System of Invention Registration:
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 24 (2011),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.pdf (“The recently
enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act . . . represents the most significant legislative
event affecting patent law and practice in more than half a century.”). President Obama made
reform of the patent law one of the centerpieces of his 2011 economic policy agenda. See
Remarks on the Federal Budget, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 542, at 2 (Aug. 2, 2011)
(video of address available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/2011/August/080211_
DebtCompromise.mp4) (“Through patent reform, we can cut the red tape that stops too
many inventors and entrepreneurs from quickly turning new ideas into thriving businesses,
which holds our whole economy back.”). Thus, the structure of the U.S. patent system, usually the province of technocrats, academics, and high-tech lawyers, leapt to the top of the
national discussion. Of course, for many observers, it had already been there: The financial
press last summer was transfixed by a series of blockbuster deals involving patents. See, e.g.,
Quentin Hardy, Google Buys Motorola for Patent Parts, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/quentinhardy/2011/08/15/google-buys-motorola-for-patentparts; Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (July 1, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/apple-and-microsoftbeat-google-for-nortel-patents. Even National Public Radio’s popular This American Life
program joined the fray, with an hour-long program in July 2011 on “patent trolls.” See
When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE (Chicago Public Media radio broadcast, July 22, 2011),
available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patentsattack.
7. See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 6, at 24 (noting the “AIA’s imposition of
a first-to-file-or-first-to-publicly-disclose system, which replaces an over 200-year-old firstto-invent tradition”).
8. Different provisions of the new law became effective at different times, ranging
from the date of enactment of the AIA on September 16, 2011, until March 16, 2013. The
relevant provisions here—the new priority rules—are effective for patent applications filed
on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(n)(1) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 100 note (2011)).
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time) when a patent application was filed with the U.S. Patent Office for the
priority determination. As we explain further below, the AIA implements a
modified version of the traditional FTF rule, wherein in most cases the first inventor to publish his invention will be given the rights (as long as he follows
the publication with a timely application to the U.S. Patent Office).9 But in
broad strokes, the Act implements a shift in American patent law from FTI to
FTF; the United States is the last country to make this change in its patent
system.10
Although the FTF system has advantages—it is simpler and less costly to
administer, and it encourages earlier patent applications11—it may have a darker side for small inventors.12 Since they are likely to be slower in turning an invention into a patent application than larger corporations, they will be less likely to win a patent race. Under the FTI rule, this was not especially relevant,
because the date of invention determined patent priority and the scope of prior
art. But under FTF, a successful patentee must not only invent, but also win the
race to draft and submit a patent application that satisfies the requirements of
the patent law. Companies with significant research and development (R&D)
operations are more likely to have patent attorneys on staff with experience
working with the company’s inventors. This can substantially cut down the
time necessary to transform an invention into an application. Small inventors
are much more likely to be resource constrained, and much less likely to have
staff attorneys or existing relationships with outside counsel—placing the small
inventor at a potential disadvantage in a FTF regime.
What impact will this major patent reform have? Although there were
years of debate prior to the passage of the AIA, there has been virtually no em-

9. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
10. In 1998, the Philippines switched to a first-to-file system, leaving the United States

as the last country with a first-to-invent system. Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo,
World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 548 & n.38 (1998). Canada’s switch
in 1989 is regarded as the last major industrialized nation to switch before the U.S.’s recent
shift—a fact which we exploit for our study.
11. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules
Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1313, 1331 & n.99 (2003) (noting that a FTF system encourages an inventor “to file her patent application as early as possible” and describing the costs of patent litigation under the FTI system). Switching to FTF also harmonized
the U.S. patent system with that of the rest of the world, arguably as required by international treaty obligations.
12. As we make clear in our discussion of our study, the data we used allowed us to
compare patenting behavior of individual inventors—those inventors filing patent applications on their own behalf—versus other types of patent applicants (such as corporations,
governments, educational institutions, and nonprofit organizations). Thus, although our discussion applies most directly to individual inventors, there will plainly be implications from
our findings for small entities seeking patents, such as small companies or (small) nonprofits. Thus, we use the term “small inventors” to include these smaller patenting entities as
well as individual inventors.
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pirical work completed to date.13 In this Article we aim to correct that deficiency and predict that the AIA will have a negative impact on small inventors. We
do so by examining the effect of a very similar law change in Canada, the last
major country preceding the United States to change to first-to-file,14 which it
did with the Canadian Patent Act reforms that took effect in 1989.15 By examining data on over one million patents in both Canada and the United States,
and by using sophisticated econometric methodology, we are able to estimate
the effects of the Canadian law change.16 Like the AIA, the Canadian Patent
Act made several other changes to patent law besides the priority rule, and we
therefore go to some pains to establish that the results we find are due to the
priority rule change.
We find that the Canadian change to FTF generally harmed individual inventors. One simple measure of its impact is a drop in the share of patents
granted to individuals after the law change. However, we note that this drop
could be due to general long-term trends (like an increase in R&D funding
among larger entities) rather than the priority rule change itself. Thus we use a
difference-in-difference technique,17 which allows us to address any overall
trends by using U.S. patenting behavior as a control group. Patenting in the
United States generally follows similar patterns to those in Canada, but the
United States did not change its patent law around 1989.18 Thus, comparing the
13. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1301-05 (discussing the politics of the firstto-invent versus first-to-file rules); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent
System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
425, 426 (2002) (noting the controversy surrounding proposals to switch to first-to-file).
14. Michael F. Martin, The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of Its
Origin, 49 IDEA 435, 439 n.16 (2009) (explaining that after Canada’s change, the United
States was the only country with a FTI system).
15. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Relation Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33 (Can.) (amending Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. P-4); see also Gregory C. Ludlow, Intellectual Property (1987-93), Part I—
Summary of Government Activity, 25 OTTAWA L. REV. 89, 103 (1993) (noting the change).
16. For more information on the impact of the Canadian law change, see generally
ROBIN COSTER, FROM FIRST-TO-INVENT TO FIRST-TO-FILE: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
(2002), available at http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/
ARTech-19T.pdf; Philip C. Mendes da Costa, NAFTA—The Canadian Response or Why
Does the Canadian Patent Act Keep Changing?, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 65 (1994); Blake R. Wiggs,
Canada’s First-to-File Experience—Should the U.S. Make the Move?, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 493 (1991); Shih-tse Lo & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Does It Matter
Who Has the Right to Patent: First-to-Invent or First-to-File? Lessons from Canada (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14926, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14926.
17. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 450-54 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the use and implementation of the differencein-difference approach in analyzing policy).
18. Although Canada has a much smaller population than the United States, and a correspondingly smaller economy, the two economies are very “highly integrated”—for reasons
that include geographic proximity of the Canadian population and expansive free trade
agreements between the countries, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
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difference between the differences in individual grant rate in the United States
and Canada will isolate the net effect of the Canadian law change. We find that
there is a substantial decline in patents granted to individuals due to the change
in priority rule: about a fourteen-percent drop.19
Our findings do not augur well for small inventors in the United States.
While the AIA differs in important ways from the Canadian law, there are
enough similarities that we should see parallel effects.20 In addition to harming
small inventors, some have suggested that the AIA may also encourage lowerquality patent applications. One of the purposes of the patent document is to
disclose information about the invention to the public: this is what a patentee
provides in exchange for the exclusive right to make, use, and sell her invention.21 In preliminary work, we explore this potential effect of FTF in the Canadian context by performing a basic linguistic analysis of patents before and
after the law change. We use word count, sophistication of words, and similar
measures as proxies for how much information a patent conveys. We find no
evidence of a substantial impact of the law change on patent quality.
The America Invents Act changes the United States to the first-to-file system, but fortunately there are provisions in the Act that call for studies such as
this to help inform its implementation.22 In the rest of this Article, we detail
why we expect the Act to be harmful to small inventors in its current form. In
addition, we empirically estimate, for the first time, the effect of the priority
rule on patenting behavior and patent quality.
The balance of the Article follows in three Parts. In Part I, we detail the
policy questions surrounding the FTI versus FTF systems, as well as discuss
(NAFTA). See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33087, UNITED STATESCANADA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 1 (2006). The
United States and Canada also have similar economic sectoral components, and cross-border
trade to the other is a major component of each country’s economy. See id. at 1, 3-8. But see
id. at 1-6 (noting that the U.S. and Canadian economies, although similar in many respects,
diverge in others). Although productivity in Canada is lower than in the United States—
perhaps as a result of lower capital intensity, see, e.g., Someshwar Rao et al., Measuring the
Canada-U.S. Productivity Gap: Industry Dimensions, INT’L PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR, Fall
2004, at 3, 13-14 (discussing the “productivity gap” and noting the contribution of capital
intensity)—in our view, the very close economic similarities (indeed, integration) between
the countries make the Canadian-U.S. comparison especially apt.
19. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
20. The most important difference is that the AIA includes a so-called “first-topublish” exception. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1),
125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)). This means that inventors have a one-year grace period from publication of an invention before they must submit
their patent application.
21. See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 407-10 (2010).
22. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 26 (requiring a U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office study to determine the effect of the AIA “with respect to patent rights, innovation in
the United States, competitiveness of United States markets, access by small businesses to
capital for investment, and such other issues”).
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the changes implemented by the America Invents Act and the Canadian Patent
Act in greater detail. Part II introduces our datasets, obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO). In Part III we detail our empirical strategy and present the main
results. Part III also explores some possible shortcomings of our analysis, and
seeks to address the main objections to our results. We end with a brief Conclusion with discussion of the possible policy implications and suggestions for further research.
I. FIRST-TO-INVENT VERSUS FIRST-TO-FILE: A PRIMER
Patent priority is a relatively straightforward concept, determining the
question of who, among contemporaneous inventors of a particular subject matter, is awarded the patent to that subject matter. In a perfect world, patent systems would not require such rules: inventors would work on distinct inventions,
and receive patents on them once (or if) they had reached the substantive
thresholds for patentability. Unfortunately, it is common for inventors to work
on overlapping or even the same inventions, often at nearly the same time—
information is simply not available to prevent such occurrences.23 It is under
these circumstances in which the priority rules step in, allocating the patent
rights to single inventors (or inventive entities, in the case of joint
inventorship). Note that regardless of how the rules allocate the patent grants,
these circumstances are costly for both inventors and society.24 Thus, the system of allocating priority matters—significantly.25
To date, modern patent systems have used one of two systems for allocating priority to patent rights. The first, known as the first-to-invent system, attempts to grant the rights to the inventor who can prove the earliest date of invention.26 What this means is that the decisionmaking body, whether the Patent
23. The ensuing competition to obtain a patent is called a “patent race.” See, e.g.,
Drew Fudenberg et al., Preemption, Leapfrogging and Competition in Patent Races, 22 EUR.
ECON. REV. 3, 3 (1983); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 312 (1992).
24. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 23, at 313.
25. Imagine being part of a research team that works for years (and spends millions of
dollars) to solve a particular technological problem. Unbeknownst to the investors or researchers, a similar research team was concurrently working on the same problem (and also
spending millions of dollars). Assuming near contemporaneous development of the solution,
the patent priority rules would then determine the winner and loser of this race, with the loser having not only lost the investment, but also perhaps being precluded from further closely
related research.
One issue that is not well known empirically is how much the priority rules matter for
the general welfare of society. Priority rules which discourage wasteful duplication of effort
would be beneficial. But it may be the case that the reward of a patent for priority of invention induces more rapid and sophisticated research and that the benefits outweigh the costs of
duplicative effort.
26. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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Office or the courts, must weigh various kinds of evidence relating to the inventive process and its timing. The second, and dominant, approach has been
the first-to-file system, wherein the first inventor to file his application in the
relevant jurisdiction is awarded the patent.27 As compared to the first-to-invent
approach, the evidentiary inquiry required for awarding priority under first-tofile is substantially reduced—indeed, almost nonexistent.
Both of these approaches are modified first-in-time systems. One might
reasonably ask whether there might be a better system for allocating patent
rights among competing inventors. For example, a system might instead grant
the rights to the inventor best suited to commercialize the technology.28 Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy have recommended, as part of a dramatic
rethinking of the patent prosecution process, that the first inventor to receive a
granted patent (from among competing private patent offices, rather than from
the centralized USPTO) be awarded priority.29 Or perhaps the patent rights
could be auctioned or shared among closely competing inventors. For our purposes, however, we do not consider these other approaches, and instead investigate the relative effects between the first-to-invent system (the historic U.S.
system) and the first-to-file approach (used elsewhere and now in the United
States as well, after the effective date of this portion of the AIA).
A. First-to-Invent: U.S. and Canadian Approaches
The U.S. patent priority system before the AIA became effective was codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), which, until March 16, 2013, read in relevant part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— . . . .
....
. . . before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed
it. In determining priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to
conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other.30

This section has been interpreted by the courts to mean that the patent grant
under the FTI system was given31 to a prior inventor (who did not abandon,

27. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
28. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,

20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
29. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1606 (2009).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 102, 102(g)(2) (2011).
31. Note that there were two possible procedural postures of priority contests. In the
first—known as an “interference”—the USPTO conducted a proceeding under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) to determine which of those who filed applications claiming the same subject matter would receive the patent grant. In the second, during postgrant litigation, a court will de-

WAGNER & ABRAMS 65 STAN. L. REV. 517.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

March 2013]

POISONING THE NEXT APPLE?

2/25/2013 4:08 PM

525

suppress, or conceal the invention), if that prior inventor could show (1) a first
reduction to practice of the invention, or (2) a first conception of the invention,
plus reasonable diligence from that time until a time just prior to conception by
another.32 In contrast, invention in Canada’s FTI regime was defined as the
date that the inventor “first formulated the knowledge necessary to enable an
ordinary skilled workman to duplicate the invention and obtain the benefits
from it.”33 For systems basing patent priority on the date of invention, the filing
date of the application was not determinative—though the first filer had some
important evidentiary advantages in these proceedings.34
In both countries, if the patent office believed that a pending patent application overlapped with another patent or application, it was necessary for an
adjudication to occur to determine the first inventor. On the whole, Canadian
proceedings to determine priority were much simpler than their American
counterparts.35
The American FTI priority rules, as established in § 102(g), were highly
complex, involving careful definitions of what terms such as “reduce to practice,”36 “conception,”37 and “reasonable diligence”38 meant. (Not to mention
abandonment, suppression, or concealment.)39 In addition, there were substan-

termine whether the provisions of § 102(g) have been violated, and thus whether the patent is
invalid because of a prior inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, at ch. 2300 (8th ed.,
9th rev. 2012) (describing interference proceedings).
32. See, e.g., Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 157778 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
33. Charles P. Curphey & Norris M. Eades, Canadian Patent Practice—How Different
Is It?, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 4, 15-16 & n.45 (1975) (quoting Christiani & Nielsen v. Rice,
[1930] S.C.R. 443, 456 (Can.)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The holding here, therefore, is that by the date of discovery of the invention is meant the date at which the inventor
can prove he has first formulated, either in writing or verbally, a description which affords
the means of making that which is invented.”).
34. For the American presumption in favor of the first filer under the FTI system, see
37 C.F.R. § 41.207(a)(2) (2012) (requiring that any party seeking to prove an earlier date of
invention bear the burden of proof), and Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1192 & n.2, 119394 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For the Canadian presumption, see COSTER, supra note 16, at 7-8.
35. See Robert A. Wilkes, The Canadian Viewpoint: A New Perspective Bridging the
First-to-Invent and First-to-File Worlds, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 18, 20 (1990) (explaining that the
American interference procedure was more complex than the Canadian conflict because the
latter “is handled on the basis of a written record only; there are no provisions for motions,
discovery, and the like, and there is no hearing (either before the Commissioner or the Patent
Appeal Board) in the entire process within the Patent Office”).
36. See, e.g., Eaton, 204 F.3d at 1097.
37. See, e.g., Brown, 276 F.3d at 1332; Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d
588, 594 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
38. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 3A DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT § 10.07[4][d], [f] (2012).
39. See Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 654-55 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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tial evidentiary complexities: proving earlier dates of invention (typically most
important for the later filer) required each party to bear the burden of proof, and
in some cases, the later filer would face a heightened (“clear and convincing
evidence”) standard.40 Further, corroborating evidence was always required in
these areas.41
B. First-to-File: U.S. and Canadian Approaches
By contrast to the FTI rule, the FTF system is (relatively) simple and
straightforward. For example, the Canadian FTF rule states:
The subject-matter defined by a claim in an application for a patent in
Canada . . . must not have been disclosed
....
(c) in an application for a patent that is filed in Canada by a person other
than the applicant, and has a filing date that is before the claim date . . . .42

There are other provisions that deal with contemporaneously filed applications claiming priority to earlier applications (or foreign applications),43 but the
basic thrust is the same: the patent right goes to the first inventor who files her
application with the patent office.
However, the Canadian Patent Act recognizes a significant exception to the
first-to-file rule. If an inventor discloses his invention to the public, he has a
one-year grace period in which he alone can patent the disclosed material.44
Others seeking to patent the disclosed material will be barred from patenting, as
the material would be novelty-defeating prior art.45
The U.S. FTF rules are similar in basic approach46: the patent grant is given to the inventor with the earliest “effective filing date,”47 but is subject to
some additional exceptions—including a provision similar to the Canadian
grace period which allows a later filer to win priority if she publicly disclosed
(or caused to be publicly disclosed) her invention prior to the filing of the earlier application.48

See 37 C.F.R. § 41.207(a)(2) (2012).
Brown, 276 F.3d at 1335.
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 § 28.2(1).
See id. § 28.2(1)(d)(i)-(iv).
See id. § 28.2(1)(a); CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST: PATENTS IV(4)(b)(ii) (4th
ed. 2008) (describing the grace period).
45. See Wiggs, supra note 16, at 496-97.
46. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284,
285-87, 293 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102) (removing rules establishing a first-toinvent system and replacing them with a first-to-file system).
47. The effective filing date refers to either the filing date of the application in question or the filing date of an earlier application from which the current application can claim
the benefit of that earlier date. See id.
48. See id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)). In a sense this creates something
of a “first to publish” system by making first disclosure an important defense against a first
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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Tucked into the disclosure exception of the AIA is a derivation clause protecting an inventor if a third party discloses his invention. Specifically, the statute states that if the disclosure derives from the work of the potential patentee it
cannot be used as prior art against the original inventor and source of information.49 Unfortunately, “disclosure” and “derivation” are left somewhat unclear in the Act.50 It is clear, however, that interference proceedings are now
replaced with derivation proceedings.51 Derivation proceedings will allow potential patentees to challenge a third-party patent on the grounds that the contained subject derived from the petitioner’s patent.52
The AIA also implements a two-track application system. For a significant
fee, a patentee may request expedited review of her application.53 Similarly,
Canada requires inventors to opt in to a formal examination of their patent for
an additional fee.54 The request may be made up to five years after filing,
though after that period, the patent is considered abandoned.55 Both Canada
and the United States reduce fees for small entities.56
The Canadian and American transitions from first-to-invent to first-to-file
are, in a broad sense, identical. The first-to-invent priority rules of both nations
were a complex jungle, aimed at seeking out the true first inventor. In their

filer. Jim Longacre, 35 USC § 102 and the First to File System, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING
ISSUES ANALYSIS, Oct. 2011, available at 2011 Emerging Issues 5978.
49. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(b)(1) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)(2)).
50. See John E. Schneider, Leahy-Smith America Invents Act—Patent Reform 2011 Is
Finally Here, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Sept. 2011, available at 2011
Emerging Issues 5929.
51. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(i) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135(a))
(“An applicant for patent may file a petition to institute a derivation proceeding in the Office.
The petition shall set forth with particularity the basis for finding that an inventor named in
an earlier application derived the claimed invention from an inventor named in the petitioner’s application and, without authorization, the earlier application claiming such invention
was filed.”).
52. Derivation Proceedings, SUGHRUE MION, PLLC, at 1, http://www.sughrue.com/
files/uploads/documents/fadi_article_derivation.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
53. Edward Fan & Karen Townsend, United States Converts to First-to-File Patent
System, TORYS LLP 1-2 (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/
Publication%20PDFs/IP2011-4.pdf (explaining that the current fee for prioritized review for
large-entity applicants is set at $4800).
54. See Tariff of Fees—Patents, CAN. INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/
cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00142.html (last modified Jan. 2, 2013).
55. How Your Patent Application Is Processed, CAN. INTELL. PROP. OFF.,
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr03002.html (last modified
Apr. 4, 2011).
56. See David Black, Size Matters Under the America Invents Act, PAT. REFORUM
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://americainventsact.com/size-matters-under-the-america-invents-act
(explaining that “for many years” small entities benefited from a fee reduction of 50% and
that the AIA increases the fee reduction for microentities to 75%); Tariff of Fees, supra note
54 (describing the two-track fee structure for small and large entities for reexamination requests).
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transition to first-to-file, both nations retained a flavor of the FTI system
through a disclosure exception.
As a statute, the AIA remains unclear. Numerous commentaries speak to
the potential complexities and statutory ambiguities.57 Only as courts work
through the AIA’s challenges and contours will we definitively know its scope
and content. However, these details and intricacies pale in comparison to the
broad-based structural change inherent in the AIA.
C. The Policy of Patent Priority Rules
There are a variety of important policy questions related to a shift to a firstto-file system, including issues of efficiency and international harmonization.58
The policy question we address here is whether a first-to-file system discriminates against individual inventors, small businesses, or nonprofits, rendering
them less likely to obtain effective patent protection than larger organizations.59 (A weaker version of this question is whether the U.S. first-to-invent
system could favor such entities.)60 The suggestion is that a first-to-invent system—which necessarily allows a later applicant to obtain the patent rights to an
invention first claimed in an earlier application by another inventor—permits
those with fewer resources (e.g., individuals, small business, and nonprofits) to
obtain patent protection without the need to “rush” to the door of the patent office.61 There are good reasons to believe that organizations with more resources
will be, on balance, more able to file patent applications quickly. At the simplest level, the cost of patenting is likely to be less of a concern for larger organizations.62 Further, additional resources allow more patent attorneys or
57. See Eric E. Bensen, America Invents Act, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS,
Sept. 2011, available at 2011 Emerging Issues 5900; Longacre, supra note 48; Donald S.
Chisum, America Invents Act of 2011: Analysis and Cross-References (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.chisum.com/wp-content/uploads/AIAOverview.pdf; Donald S. Chisum, Priority
Among Competing Patent Applicants Under the American Invents Act (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969592.
58. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing policy implications of
FTI versus FTF); see also Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now—The Case for Patent
Harmonization, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 291, 300 (1995).
59. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Introduction to Symposium, The Harmonization of
International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 447-48 (1993); Lemley & Chien,
supra note 11, at 1304-05.
60. See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The First-to-Invent Rule in the U.S. Patent System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
514, 515 (2005) (updating earlier work).
61. See, e.g., Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 267 (1995) (“Independent inventors, who are often the backbone of
new companies, will be especially vulnerable against large multinational corporations who
can afford to mount continuing legal challenges.”).
62. The most recent statistics available from the American Intellectual Property Law
Association suggests that on average filing a patent application of low complexity costs
about $7000, and that filing a patent of relative complexity costs between $9000 and
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agents to be dedicated to drafting and filing applications. The inventors in larger organizations may be more able to redirect the time that would otherwise be
required by the patent application process toward their other duties. Larger organizations may have routinized patenting procedures, designed to yield rapid
applications. Smaller organizations and individuals, with constrained patenting
resources, may wish to wait until the commercial potential of an invention is
clearer prior to filing. Each of these factors, and likely several more, at minimum raises a serious question about the effect on individual inventors and
small businesses of a change to the first-to-file system.
It is important to understand, however, that the rules of patent priority are
far from the only set of incentives operating on a putative patentee’s decision
on whether to patent, and when. Indeed, while the first-to-invent system may at
first glance seem to have encouraged waiting to apply for a patent (or at least
not penalized it substantially),63 the rules themselves did the opposite. For example, the first applicant in a priority contest (known as the “senior party”)
gained a de facto presumption that he is the first inventor, forcing the later filer
(the “junior party”) to present proof of an earlier invention date.64 Furthermore,
other critical patent rules, most prominently those related to prior art, strongly
encouraged an early filing—simply, the earlier the filing date, the less prior art
would be available.65 Thus, while the first-to-invent rules offered an important
benefit to later patent applicants, their incentive effect is likely to be muted by
other countervailing incentives built into the patent system.
On the other hand, it is clear that the patent priority rules do matter significantly. Several scholars have analyzed the results of priority contests under
former 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) and found that junior parties—later filers of applications—win over forty percent of the time, a somewhat surprising number, given
the evidentiary advantages given to the first applicants.66 Interestingly, the size
of the parties seems to have relatively little effect on the win rates in priority
contests.67
Priority rules may have a substantial impact for another reason: the determination of what is included in “prior art.” Under the FTI system, a person
could lose the right to a patent if the invention was known, used, or described
in print before the claimed date of invention.68 Under a first-to-file system, the

$12,000. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25
(2009); see also Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1309-14
(2009) (discussing the sensitivity of startups to the costs of patenting and enforcement).
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2011).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., id. § 102(a), (b).
66. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1309 (reporting that junior parties won forty-three percent of the time based on a sample population of 100 cases).
67. See, e.g., id. at 1321-22; Mossinghoff, supra note 60, at 517-18.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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key date becomes not the date of invention, but the filing date. Because a filing
date will obviously be later than an invention date, this expands the period of
time during which there could be invalidating prior art available and thus reduces the likelihood of validity. This is another mechanism by which the
change in priority system may affect the worth of a patent, but with the same
impact: that the expected value on the date of invention is likely to be diminished.
This question has more than distributional import. Although it is clear that
the rate of individual patenting has been decreasing in the United States over
time,69 it is widely believed that individuals and small entities have an important impact on the innovation ecosystem—perhaps an outsized impact.70
This is for several reasons. First, there is some evidence that the inventions
from smaller entities are more likely to be disruptive in nature, moving the pace
of technological change forward.71 Second, in some industries, such as high
technology and pharmaceuticals, small companies and individuals serve as important innovation inputs into larger, established companies.72 Finally, even if
small entities are no more effective than their larger counterparts at innovation,
the distribution of patent rights—and thus marketplace power—has important
consequences.
This is not to suggest that we have a firm view on the value of innovations
by individuals and small firms versus large companies, or that we take a position regarding the wisdom of the change in the United States to a first-to-file
rule. Our point here is to note that there is some evidence to suggest that if the
first-to-file rules indeed disproportionately impact small entities, that could
have important effects on innovation. In short, this is an important policy
change that appears to have potential impact on long-term innovation.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
As the foregoing suggests, there is a need to empirically investigate one of
the major (if not the major) claims related to the shift from first-to-invent to
first-to-file in the United States: that the change will adversely affect the patent69. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT: JANUARY 1,
1986—DECEMBER 31, 2010, at A2-1 (2011).
70. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 910-11
(2002); Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1202-03 (2008).
71. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 131-34 (3d
ed. 1950) (discussing the stationary state that would result without entrepreneurs); see also
ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 3-10 & tbl.1-1 (1988).
72. See ZOLTAN J. ACS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 1-8,
147-54 (1990); CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM
CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE (2003); see also, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al.,
Knowledge Spillovers and Patent Citations: Evidence from a Survey of Inventors, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 215, 218 (2000).
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ing behavior of individuals and small entities, as compared to larger organizations. An obvious obstacle in conducting this investigation is the fact that the
United States has just changed its priority rules, so there is no way to directly
compare the U.S. first-to-invent system with the first-to-file system found in
the America Invents Act.
Although the United States had not undertaken a change in priority rules
until now, the most recent such shift in a highly-developed country occurred in
Canada in 1989, and this law change offers an opportunity for empirical investigation. Canada has a patent system very similar to that of the United States,
has similar economic features to the United States, close geographic proximity,
and a similar innovation environment to the United States—making it a good
control.73 Since the focus of this Article is patenting behavior, in order for the
United States to serve as a good control group, a similar patenting environment
is critical. Figure 1 shows the share of patents by technology category in the
United States and Canada. As can be seen, there is a strong correlation between
the shares of technology classes in the United States and in Canada.
FIGURE 1
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Our basic research strategy is to exploit the 1989 change from first-toinvent to first-to-file in Canada as a means to get insights into what impact that
shift in the United States might have. Specifically, we investigate how the law

73. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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change affected the patenting behavior of individual inventors relative to larger
entities.
However, simply comparing the patenting behavior of Canadian individual
inventors before and after the law change allows only limited insight into the
question. For example, one would not be able to rule out the possibility that any
change in activity was related to an array of other factors, for example, changes
in the macroeconomy. Thus, we need a control group to help isolate the effect
of the Canadian law change. For this we use the United States. Since the United
States did not change its priority rules during the time of the Canadian law
change, and given the similarities between the U.S. and Canadian patent systems (not to mention economies), the United States serves as a good control.
The research design we employ is a modern econometric technique known as a
difference-in-difference analysis,74 which is used to control for effects other
than the priority rule change. By comparing the observed differences in individual patenting behavior in Canada across the 1989 change in the law to the
differences in individual patenting behavior in the United States during the
same time period, we can isolate the effect of the law change on individual patenting behavior in Canada.
The difference-in-difference technique is aimed at closely approximating
the ideal scientific experiment, with treatment and control groups. In this case,
Canada is the treated group, since it had the change in priority rule. Ideally, one
would compare it to an identical country (the control group) that did not have
such a change. In this study, we use the United States as the control group,
since it is similar in many important ways to Canada, and did not have a priority rule change at the same time. By comparing the change in Canada with the
change in the United States, we can cleanly detect the effect of just the law
change, and not other spurious effects, such as those related to global changes
in innovation.75
A. The Canadian Law Change
In 1986, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Relation Thereto was introduced in Canada.76 The bill passed the House
of Commons on May 6, 1987, and the Senate on November 19, 1987. The law
changes became effective on October 1, 1989. Patent applications filed prior to

74. See, e.g., JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 227-43 (2009).
75. A good control group must be similar to the treatment group in the absence of the
treatment. In this case, given the similarity of the economies and innovation in the two countries, we believe the United States satisfies the requirements of a good control.
76. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Relation Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33 (Can.).
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October 1, 1989, were processed under the FTI rules, while applications after
that date were processed under the new rules.77
For our purposes here, the important change was the shift in Canada from a
FTI system to the current FTF system noted above. Prior to the enactment of
the changes in 1989, Canada’s patent priority system was similar to the U.S.
FTI system, including a procedure (called a “conflict proceeding”) to sort out
the priority of co-pending applications.78
The 1987 patent reform act also included other important changes to Canadian patent law, several of which we discuss in detail below. For one, the patentability of pharmaceutical drugs was confirmed.79 For another, the patent
term was changed from seventeen years from the date of issue to twenty years
from the date of filing.80 The law also introduced a deferred examination process whereby applicants can file applications but request that the CIPO not
begin examining them until some time later, now as much as five years later.81
And finally, maintenance fees were introduced, requiring annual payments by
both applicants and grantees to maintain their applications and patents, respectively.82
B. Prior Literature on Priority Rules
Most prior studies investigating the effect of the first-to-file system in the
United States have been based on data gathered from “interference” proceedings—the complex system implementing the first-inventor priority rules found
in 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). In general, these studies have documented little if any
impact related to entity size in the former first-to-invent system. For example,
Gerald Mossinghoff found no evidence that small entities are advantaged by
the FTI system, and indeed concluded that in some ways small entities in the
United States were disadvantaged by the FTI system.83 Specifically, he gathered data on interference proceedings from 1983 to 2004 and found that small
entities took advantage of the FTI system (by winning an interference contest
despite filing an application second) slightly less often (286 times) than the
77. See id. §§ 8-10.
78. See ROGER T. HUGHES & JOHN H. WOODLEY, HUGHES AND WOODLEY ON PATENTS

595 (1984) (describing the Canadian first-to-invent system).
79. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Relation Thereto § 6.
80. See id. § 16.
81. See id. § 12. What was initially a seven-year window was reduced to five years in
1992.
82. See id. § 16.
83. Specifically, he argued that interference proceedings, which were complex and
lengthy, favored larger entities. See Mossinghoff, supra note 60, at 520. Mark Lemley and
Colleen Chien confirmed in their study that large entities initiated interference proceedings
more than small entities and reached a similar conclusion. See Lemley & Chien, supra note
11, at 1323.
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number of times that such entities were disadvantaged (289 times) by the FTI
system (by losing an interference contest despite filing first).84 Breaking the
results out by type of entity, he found that individual inventors in particular
gained no advantage from the FTI system, and rather were disadvantaged about
10% more often than they were advantaged by the system.85 In a 2002 study,
covering the time period 1983 to 2000, Mossinghoff obtained similar results.86
In their article entitled Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, Mark Lemley and Colleen Chien empirically analyzed the results of interference proceedings and court cases involving patent priority in the United
States. They found that the first applicant—the senior party—was usually, but
by no means always, the first inventor. Indeed, they found that just over 40% of
the time, the junior party won the priority contest, though they did identify a
significant difference between outcomes in cases litigated before the Federal
Circuit and decisions by district courts and the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.87 Thus, they concluded that, contrary to some scholarly
discussion, the priority rules for patents do actually matter significantly.88
Lemley and Chien also investigated the grounds on which the victors in the
priority contests succeeded and concluded that in a large majority of cases
(67% to 76% depending on the party type), the showing of a first reduction to
practice is the grounds for victory.89 This is a somewhat surprising result, given
the complexity of the priority rules—only rarely do parties win on the basis of
earlier conception, or the lack of diligence of the other party, or abandonment,
suppression, or concealment.90 Lemley and Chien argued, therefore, that the
priority rules could be greatly streamlined, eliminating much of the complexity
and cost, without changing the results in the cases very much.91
While Lemley and Chien did not themselves try to determine whether the
FTI system benefited or harmed small entities or individual inventors, they argued that their findings were consistent with Mossinghoff’s suggestion that the
system did not greatly benefit these groups.92 In particular, as noted above,
they found that large entities were more likely to initiate interference proceedings, suggesting that “[i]f anything, small entities are getting bogged down in
interference proceedings initiated by larger companies.”93 They also argued
that their basic findings—that first inventors are sometimes the last to file—

Mossinghoff, supra note 60, at 517.
See id. at 519 & fig.5 ((167 − 139) ⁄ (167 + 139) = 0.0915).
See Mossinghoff, supra note 13, at 430.
Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1309.
See id. at 1308; cf. Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First-to-File Patent System: A
Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67, 84 (1997).
89. Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1315.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 1318-19.
92. Id. at 1323.
93. Id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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would not much change under a first-to-file system: the extra incentives to file
more quickly should apply, they said, across categories of inventors, so there is
little reason to think that first inventors would themselves be more likely to file
early.94 We are not so sure this makes intuitive sense.
Assume there is variation in the cost to file quickly (e.g., hiring attorneys,
preparing the patent application, etc.) for different types of inventors. When the
filing date is irrelevant, this heterogeneous cost will not impact filing dates very
much—other considerations or just random variation will determine filing
dates, leading to no systematic difference in filing dates across the types of inventors under a FTI system. A change to FTF would substantially increase the
incentives for both types of inventors to file early. This would be much cheaper
for the low-cost inventors to achieve, and thus we would expect to see more patents filed sooner by this class, which we assert, corresponds well to large
corporations.
Thus, the major empirical analyses related to the former FTI priority system in the United States are limited in their ability to answer the question of
whether the system helps or hurts individual inventors and small entities. First,
by relying on data related to actual priority contests, these studies only tell us
what happened when there was a significant claim that a first inventor was the
last to file.95 That is, they do not measure the effects that the FTI system versus
the FTF system might have on the basic incentives to file for patents. Second,
although Lemley and Chien do not read their study this way, some of their results do seem to challenge Mossinghoff’s premise that the FTI system is not
beneficial to small entities. First, the very fact that the FTI system matters—
that the first inventorship rules of priority do indeed drive the results in a substantial minority of cases—together with the arguments that individuals and
small businesses are somewhat less likely on the margin to file quickly, lends
some weight to the suggestion that small entities were favored under the FTI
system. Second, the relative simplicity of the priority contests, typically only
requiring a showing of an earlier date of reduction to practice, suggests that the
complexity of the FTI system was not a disproportionate burden on small entities. Thus, we think it is safe to say that most of the research to date does not
offer much information on the effect of the first-to-invent rule, especially with
respect to entity size—which is perhaps the primary argument in policy circles
right now.
In addition to these U.S. studies, there is one interesting study that takes a
similar—though not identical—approach to the one we conduct here. In Does It
Matter Who Has the Right to Patent: First-to-Invent or First-to-File? Lessons

94. Id. at 1313.
95. Both interference proceedings and litigation (the two venues by which a priority

contest can be resolved) are extremely expensive and thus involve only a very small fraction
of all patents; therefore, when a priority contest does actually occur, the stakes must be substantial.
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from Canada, Shih-tse Lo and Dhanoos Sutthiphisal investigated whether the
Canadian law change in 1989—from FTI to FTF—had a measurable impact on
innovative output in Canada.96 By comparing industry-level inventive activity
between Canada and the United States, they concluded that the change to FTF
had a “small negative impact.”97 Lo and Sutthiphisal focused their analysis on
the years 1983 to 1994, seeking to avoid entangling their results with other possible policy changes in the United States or Canada.98 Using patent counts as a
measure of inventive output, their model attempted to explore the differences in
output per R&D inputs in 1983 (under the FTI system) and 1994 (under the
FTF system).99 They also used Americans who sought patents in Canada as a
baseline comparator, arguing that Americans’ inventive activity would be less
impacted by the Canadian FTF reforms than would domestic inventors’.100 Finally, they also looked at Canadian patent filings abroad (in the United States
and Europe) to account for other changes in the 1989 reforms, most especially
the inclusion of maintenance fees.101 In general, they found relatively little impact on patenting behavior attributed to the change to FTF in 1989.102 They
did, however, find that Canadian small businesses and individuals patented less
in the United States after the law change, implying a decrease in inventive activity.103 Thus, they tentatively concluded that the changes in the law seemed to
channel patenting behavior towards larger businesses.104
C. Data Used in This Study
In order to empirically investigate the impact of the first-to-file priority
rule, we obtained bibliographic data on granted patents from the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).105 For both datasets we focus on applications filed during the

Lo & Sutthiphisal, supra note 16, at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 26. Although Lo and Sutthiphisal used Canadian patenting in the United
States as their measure in order to avoid picking up effects related to the maintenance fees,
their result seems equally explained by the rise in costs of Canadian patenting as a result of
the new fees. That is, larger entities can expect to see a shift in patenting in their direction
when the costs of patenting rise, and since many Canadian inventors file both in the United
States and Canada, increases in the costs of patenting in Canada will likely have a similar
effect on the costs of patenting—to Canadian companies—in the United States.
104. Id. at 27.
105. Canadian data are available in bulk form from CIPO. See IP Data Products, CAN.
INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/
h_wr01933.html (last modified Dec. 14, 2012). The U.S. data are available in bulk form
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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period from 1984 to 1993.106 This period is chosen to allow a long enough
timespan to detect changes in patenting behavior due to the law change, but not
so long that long-term trends and other changes are likely to introduce excess
noise into the data.107 The U.S. and Canadian datasets are similar, and both include information on application date, patent grant date, inventor, assignee, patent number, number and word count of claims, and technology classification.
One significant difference between the two datasets is the size: there are
163,464 patents in the Canadian data and 890,344 in the U.S. data. While the
total number of patents granted in the United States is over five times that of
Canada, the disparity goes in the other direction when normalizing for country
size or GDP. Using 1990 populations,108 there were 6.32 patents granted per
1000 Canadians and 3.59 patents per 1000 Americans.109 Additionally, through
the ten-year period of the data, there were 294 patents granted in Canada per
billion dollars (1989 U.S. dollars) of annual GDP compared with 162 patent
grants in the United States per billion dollars of annual GDP.110
Because the focus of this investigation is the impact of the priority rule on
what types of entities are granted patents, it is crucial to have a clear definition
of an individual patentee.111 In both the Canadian and U.S. data, inventors must
be individuals, but assignees can be individuals or corporations. There can be
multiple inventors and assignees in both datasets. In the Canadian data, we define a patent as having a corporate inventor—and thus not an individual patentee—if at least one of the assignees as of the grant date is not also an inventor.
This is because in the Canadian dataset, individual inventors are also listed assignees, in addition to any corporate assignees.
The U.S. data is easier to classify, due to additional data made available by
the USPTO.112 A “small entity status” field is included with that dataset that
includes a classification of the type of assignee entity. We create a binary varifrom the USPTO. See Electronic Data Products, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/products/catalog/index.jsp (last modified Jan. 2, 2013).
106. For both datasets, the application date is the actual filing date of the patent application.
107. Some specifications use shorter time periods in order to focus even more precisely
on the 1989 law change.
108. See Estimated Population of Canada, 1605 to Present, STAT. CANADA,
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/98-187-x/4151287-eng.htm (last modified July 6, 2009); 1990
Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen1990.html (last modified Oct. 15, 2012).
109. Note that these are total patents granted in each country, regardless of country of
origin of patentee or inventor. One important reason for the higher per capita grant rate in
Canada is that a much greater proportion of Canadian patents are granted to non-Canadians.
110. GDP data are available at the International Monetary Fund website. World Economic Outlook Databases, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/ns/
cs.aspx?id=28 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
111. All assignment data for both countries are as of the patent issue date.
112. Ideally we would compare similarly defined small entities or individuals across the
two datasets. Unfortunately, the CIPO does not include such classifications with the data.
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able that is assigned a value of 1 if the assignee type is an individual. In order
to make the coding comparable with the Canadian data, we also use a second
definition for the U.S. dataset. For this variable, we define an individual inventor as one that has a missing assignee name, implying that no assignment has
been made as of the grant and thus the inventor is likely an individual.113 The
two definitions we use for U.S. data disagree less than one time in 1000
observations.
With these definitions in place, it is useful to compare the base rates of assignment to individuals during the time period studied. In Canada, 9.9% of patents are granted to individuals, while this rate is 16.9% in the United States.
Among domestic inventors, though, the pattern is reversed, with 36.4% of Canadian patents granted to Canadians going to individuals, while in the United
States 23.2% of American entities receiving patents are individuals. The higher
overall rate of individuals in the U.S. data may therefore reflect the greater proportion that domestic patentees comprise, differences in variable definition in
the two datasets, the impact in Canada of the priority rule change, or other factors. What is much more important for the purposes of our analysis is that the
variables are relatively stable over time or trend in the same way. We examine
this shortly.
Another way to compare inventive activity in the United States and in Canada is by looking at the country of origin of inventors and assignees. In Table 1,
we see that U.S. inventors make up nearly 50% of Canadian patent grantees,
followed by Japanese inventors with 15%. Canadian inventors are fourth in
their country, with about 7% of the total. The pattern in the United States is
similar (Table 2), with U.S. inventors comprising just over half of granted patentees. This is followed by Japanese inventors, who make up 21%. Canadian
inventors account for 2% of the U.S. patent grants, but were actually granted
about 38% more patents in the United States (17,805) than in Canada (12,944).
In both countries, inventors from five large European nations (Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Italy) together comprise many
of the remaining inventors. The distribution of the home country of top assignees (not reported in the article) is very similar to that for inventors.

113. For consistency with the Canadian data, this second definition is used in the results
presented in this Article.
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TABLE 1
Top Twenty-Five Countries by Inventor Submitting Granted
Canadian Patent Applications, 1984-1993
Country of First Inventor

Number of Patents
Granted from 1984-1993

Percentage of Total

United States
Japan
Germany
Canada
France
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Australia
Finland
Belgium
Austria
Denmark
Israel
Norway
Unknown
South Africa
Hungary
Spain
Soviet Union
Republic of Korea
New Zealand
Luxembourg

80,332
23,829
12,186
12,055
8598
7123
3154
2813
2683
2108
1296
1163
1098
830
562
409
387
364
337
266
250
209
190
168
131

49.14
14.58
7.45
7.37
5.26
4.36
1.93
1.72
1.64
1.29
0.79
0.71
0.67
0.51
0.34
0.25
0.24
0.22
0.21
0.16
0.15
0.13
0.12
0.10
0.08
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TABLE 2
Top Twenty-Five Countries by Inventor Submitting Granted
U.S. Patent Applications, 1984-1993
Country of First Inventor

Number of Patents
Granted from 1984-1993

Percentage of Total

United States
Japan
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Canada
Switzerland
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Taiwan
Australia
Republic of Korea
Austria
Belgium
Israel
Finland
Denmark
Spain
Norway
Soviet Union
South Africa
Hungary
Unknown
Hong Kong

475,003
190,910
71,120
27,672
25,378
17,781
12,206
11,696
8775
7552
7474
4269
4236
3443
3259
3004
2875
1906
1319
1160
1047
1044
871
733
537

53.35
21.44
7.99
3.11
2.85
2.00
1.37
1.31
0.99
0.85
0.84
0.48
0.48
0.39
0.37
0.34
0.32
0.21
0.15
0.13
0.12
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
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A list of top corporate patentees (by assignee name) includes some of the
best-known companies in the world for both U.S. and Canadian patents (see
Tables 3 and 4, below). General Electric (GE), International Business Machines
(IBM), Canon, Toshiba, and DuPont are among the firms granted the most patents in both countries. Within the top 100 nonindividual patentees in the United States,114 there are a few entities that do not qualify as corporations: parts of
the federal government or military and a university (MIT). In the Canadian data, a few erroneous top assignees result from data entry errors,115 along with the
Canadian military, the National Research Council of Canada, and four individuals (Jean-Francois Grollier,116 David T. Green,117 Robert C. Berfield,118 and
Josef Pedain119).

114. A list of these companies and the corresponding number of patent applications is
available from the authors.
115. These include “Co.,” “Company,” “Co. KG,” “Co-Conn,” “Co. Inc.,” and “Sons
Inc.”
116. Grollier is a chemist who has directed R&D for L’Oreal since 1994. Jean-Francois
Grollier: Executive Profile, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/
research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8155200 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
117. Green holds patents on medical technologies. See Patents Related to David T.
Green, GOOGLE PATS., http://patents.google.com (search for “David T. Green”).
118. Berfield holds vacuum cleaner-related patents. See Patents Related to Robert C.
Berfield, GOOGLE PATS., http://patents.google.com (search for “Robert C. Berfield”).
119. Pedain holds chemical coatings patents. See Patents Related to Josef Pedain,
GOOGLE PATS., http://patents.google.com (search for “Josef Pedain”).
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TABLE 3
Top Companies by Number of Granted
Canadian Patent Applications, 1984-1993
Company Name

General Electric Company
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company
Sony Corporation
NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken
International Business Machines Corporation
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Shell Canada Limited
NEC Corporation
The Dow Chemical Company
Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft
Ciba-Geigy AG
Gamble Company
Eastman Kodak Company
Union Carbide Corporation
Dow Corning Corporation
Exxon Research and Engineering Company
RCA Corporation
General Motors Corporation
Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
American Cyanamid Company
Unilever PLC

Number of Patents
from 1984-1993
235
215
180
172
168
167
158
150
149
142
127
118
116
110
105
96
78
77
76
72
71
70
69
67
67
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TABLE 4
Top Companies by Number of Granted
U.S. Patent Applications, 1984-1993
Company Name
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha
Hitachi Ltd.
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba
General Electric Company
International Business Machines Corporation
Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha
Eastman Kodak Company
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd.
Motorola Inc.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd.
NEC Corporation
U.S. Philips Corporation
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft
Sony Corporation
Xerox Corporation
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
General Motors Corporation
Fujitsu Limited
The Dow Chemical Company
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company
Texas Instruments Incorporated
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha
BASF Aktiengesellschaft

Number of Patents
from 1984-1993
9189
8986
8342
7769
7210
7104
6409
6122
5333
4693
4692
4529
4446
4075
3978
3763
3662
3643
3594
3524
3400
3341
3312
3225
3156
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III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
As described in Part II above, we use the Canadian change to the patent
priority rules as a natural experiment in order to understand its relative impact
on individual inventors. In order to control for contemporaneous changes that
could also affect innovative activity, we use the United States as a control
group. The United States is chosen because of its geographic proximity, economic similarity, and close economic ties.
A. The Rate of Patenting in the United States and Canada
For an experiment to be a clean one, it is helpful for there to be a sharp discontinuity in the treated group and none (or a much smaller one) in the control
group. One measure of innovative activity in a country is the rate of patent applications. Figures 2 and 3 report these rates for Canada and the United States
for the period from 1984 to 1993. There is a substantial difference in the time
series of patent applications in the two countries.

Canadian Patents by Application Date 1984−1993
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U.S. Patents by Application Date 1984−1993
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As shown in Figure 2, in Canada, between the beginning of 1984 and mid1989, the number of subsequently granted applications was relatively stable at
around 1700 per month. After a brief spike to 3400 patents in the month immediately before the law change on October 1, 1989, the rate dropped to less than
1000 per month, which remained roughly stable (with a slight decline) through
1993. This is in sharp contrast to the pattern in U.S. patent applications, where
there was a fairly steady increase in subsequently granted applications from
6000 per month in 1984 to around 9000 in 1993. In Part III.D.3 below, we discuss further our view on the primary cause of the large overall drop in applications—the introduction of deferred examination as part of the 1989 law
change.120 For now, we take this as evidence of the substantial impact of the

120. As discussed in more detail in Part III.D.3 below, we believe we can rule out any
disproportionate impact on individual inventors related to the drop in the rate of patenting.
For example, we control for potential differences in patenting rate due to variation in representation of individuals by technology class. We do so by running regressions including
terms for technology class interacted with a post-law change dummy variable and find that
the impact of the law change on individual share is still significantly negative. If the entire
reason for the drop in Canadian patents was explained by some classes being negatively impacted by the law change, and these were just the classes that had the highest individual inventor representation, then there should be no overall effect of the post dummy. In fact, we
find it to be statistically significant and a large negative value.
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1989 law change and examine its effect on individual versus corporate inventors.
B. The Effect of First-to-File: Individual Versus Corporate Inventors
The most compelling evidence for the impact of the first-to-file rule on
small inventors is a visual difference in difference. The traditional difference in
difference subtracts the change in the control group from the change in the
treated group. In this case, the results are so stark that it is easily seen by the
visual comparison in Figure 4, which reports the representation of individual
inventors in the United States and Canada. In Figure 4 we see a sharp decline in
the fraction of individual inventors, from 10.7% prior to the end of 1989 to
7.8% afterward. During the same period in the United States, the proportion of
individual inventors dropped slightly, from 17.4% to 16.5%.
FIGURE 4

The numerical results from the difference in difference are reported in Table 5. We see that both the United States and Canada experienced a decline in
the fraction of individual inventors following the Canadian law change. This
likely represents a long-term increase in the amount of innovation occurring
under corporate auspices. But importantly, the magnitude of the decline is
about three times greater in Canada than in the United States. This is also relative to a lower baseline share of individual inventors; so in percentage terms,
the decline in Canada is almost 25%, compared to about 5% in the United
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States. The net effect of the law is reported in the bottom right hand corner of
Table 5. The proportion of individual inventors in Canada declined 1.5 percentage points more than the decline in the United States following the Canadian
law change. This result is statistically significant at well below the 1% level.121
TABLE 5
Difference in Difference: Individual Inventor Representation
Before
After
After − Before
0.1734
0.1639
-0.0095
(0.00056)**
(0.00056)**
(0.00079)**
Canada
0.1077
0.0832
-0.0245
(0.00088)**
(0.00118)**
(0.00156)**
Canada − United States
-0.0657
-0.0807
-0.0150
(0.00117)**
(0.00168)**
(0.00205)**
Cells indicate fraction of patents granted to individuals, with standard errors in
parentheses. “Before” is prior to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of
Canadian priority rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file.
* indicates significance at p < 0.05
** indicates significance at p < 0.01

United States

To make these results more precise, and allow for control variables, we run
a regression of the form
IICt = α + βC + γ * postt + δC * postt + ϵCt

(1)

where IICt is the fraction of individual inventors in the data in Country C at time
t. We code C as 1 for Canada and 0 for the United States and thus β is the Canadian fixed effect. We code postt as 1 if the application was filed after the effective date and 0 before, and thus γ captures any overall before-after effect (in
some specifications, a linear time trend is also included). The coefficient of interest is δ, which is the difference-in-difference estimate.
The results from estimating this equation by ordinary least squares regression are reported in the first column of Table 6. This result replicates what we
have already seen in Table 5, a reduction of about 1.5 percentage points in the
fraction of individual inventors after the effective date of the first-to-file
rule.122 The other columns report results from additional regressions. In column
2, rather than the using the effective date to define the before and after periods,

121. Ideally we would like to examine relative application rates of individuals and larger entities, in addition to grant rates, but application data are not available in Canada prior to
the law change.
122. Reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent (White Standard Errors).
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we use the date of bill passage, November 19, 1987. The figures indicate that
not much occurred around this date, but this specification is included for completeness. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on the interaction term is substantially smaller, although still statistically significant.
TABLE 6
Effect of Priority Rule on Fraction of Individual Inventors

IPC Class
Controls

Counts

-0.0095

-0.00623

-0.0091

254.1

(0.00253)**

(0.000741)**

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

VARIABLES

Base
Specification

Date of
Passage

Linear Time
Trend

Year
Dummies

After (γ)

-0.00956

-0.00574

-0.0107

(0.000794)**
Canada (β)

(0.000856)** (0.00140)**

(7)

(6)
Probit
Marginal
Effects

(1)

(0.000754)** (25.98)**

-0.0657

-0.0659

-0.0657

-0.0654

-0.0529

-0.0642

-952.7

(0.00105)**

(0.00130)**

(0.00105)**

(0.00105)**

(0.00101)**

(0.00100)**

(21.81)**

After * Canada

-0.0149

-0.00453

-0.0149

-0.0156

-0.0213

-0.0243

-378.6

(δ)

(0.00181)**

(0.00172)**

(0.00181)**

(0.00181)**

(0.00175)**

(0.00229)**

(26.34)**

Year

0.00023
-0.000238

Constant (α)

0.173

0.173

-0.238

0.171

0.17

1,144

(0.000561)**

(0.000709)**

-0.474

(0.000126)**

(0.000521)**

(21.44)**

Observations

1,053,808

1,053,808

1,053,808

1,053,808

1,053,808

1,053,808

240

R-squared

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.006

0.133

0.007

0.965

For columns 1-6, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 for patents granted to
individual inventors and 0 otherwise; data are at the patent level. Column 7 reports
results from data at the month-country level where the dependent variable is the count
of patents granted to individuals. Coefficients on year dummies are not reported in
column 4. Except for in column 2, “After” indicates that the patents was applied for
subsequent to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of Canadian priority
rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file. In column 2, the critical date is November 19,
1987, the date of passage. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates significance at p < 0.05
** indicates significance at p < 0.01

In columns 3 and 4 we include a linear time trend and year dummies, respectively. This is to account for overall changes that might affect innovative
activity in both the United States and Canada. The coefficient on the interaction
term is unchanged, indicating unsurprisingly that there is not a large amount of
overall change in the rate of individual innovation during this time period.
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All of the regressions to this point have used a linear probability model.
Since the dependent variable is binary, probit may be more appropriate,123 so
we run a regression of the form:
p(IICt) = Φ (α + βC + γ * postt + δC * postt + ϵCt)

(2)

Column 6 reports the marginal effects from this regression. The magnitude
of the coefficient (-0.0243) is a bit larger than in the base specification, but
once again there is a statistically significant negative effect of the law change
on individual inventor representation.
In column 7 we report results from a regression of the same form as column 1, but where now IICt is the monthly count of patents granted to individual
inventors. The result is consistent with the other specifications: there is a substantial negative impact of the law change on patents granted to individual inventors, yielding 379 fewer of them per month.
We next explore potential heterogeneity in the impact of the effect by
country of inventor. If individual inventors are more likely to patent in their
home countries, then we would expect to see a bigger impact of the Canadian
law change on Canadian inventors relative to American or other inventors. Table 7 reports results from this analysis.

123. Since this is a difference-in-difference specification and the independent variables
of interest are binary, it is unlikely that probit will yield substantially different results.

WAGNER & ABRAMS 65 STAN. L. REV. 517.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2/25/2013 4:08 PM

550

[Vol. 65:517

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

TABLE 7
Effect of Priority Rule on the Fraction of Individual Inventors

VARIABLES
After (γ)
Canada (β)
After − Canada (δ)
Constant (α)

(1)
Canada
0.000523
-0.00722
0.0256
(0.00736)**
-0.0488
(0.0119)**
0.364
(0.00510)**

(2)
United States
-0.0131
(0.00122)**
-0.143
(0.00147)**
-0.00852
(0.00254)**
0.238
(0.000872)**

(3)
All Other Countries
-0.0131
(0.000882)**
-0.0136
(0.00132)**
-0.0222
(0.00209)**
0.0912
(0.000631)**

Observations
29,836
555,335
468,637
R-squared
0.001
0.015
0.001
Each column reports results of a separate regression by country of inventor. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 for patents granted to individual inventors and 0
otherwise; data are at the patent level. “After” indicates that the patents were applied for
subsequent to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of Canadian priority
rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates significance at p < 0.05
** indicates significance at p < 0.01

Each column in the table is a separate regression run only on inventors
from the specified country. In all cases, there is a statistically significant decline in individual inventor representation following the Canadian law change.
However, as expected, the magnitude of the decline is far larger for Canadian
inventors: -0.0488, compared to -0.0085 for Americans and -0.0222 for all others. This should come as no surprise that individual inventors in Canada are
most affected by the Canadian law change. The decline in the fraction of individual inventors among other nationalities indicates that Canadian law changes
can still have a potential effect among foreign individuals considering patenting
in that country.124 Together, the empirical results indicate a statistically significant and substantial reduction in patents granted to individual inventors subsequent to the Canadian law change.

124. There are alternative explanations as well, which we discuss further in the next

Subpart.
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C. Patent Quality Changes
Besides the impact on individual inventors, the other major concern that is
often raised about a first-to-file priority rule is that it will lead to lower-quality
patent applications. Clearly, a first-to-file system encourages inventors to submit a patent application as quickly as possible following invention. The question is whether this rush leads to lower-quality patent disclosure, undermining a
major social benefit of the patent system.
Patent quality is of course an extremely difficult characteristic to measure
(and define), and it is beyond the scope of this Article to develop new techniques. However, our datasets do allow us to test certain relationships that may
(arguably) relate to the quality of patents; while by no means definitive, we
think that these metrics provide at least a rough-cut evaluation of any patent
quality changes as a result of the 1989 Canadian law change.
Because our measurement of interest in this Article is how the shift to the
FTF system affected individual inventors, we define “patent quality” as an input into granted patent characteristics: the effort (resources) dedicated to the
patent by the applicant.125 Thus, our metrics include:
The length (in words) of the first claim of each patent. Here, we expect a
higher-quality patent to be more complex, and—all other things being equal—
to have more words in the first claim.
Total number of claims. Again, we expect a higher-quality patent to be
more detailed, and thus have more claims.
Claim language complexity. Here we utilized standard metrics of language
complexity—the Flesch-Kincaid index and the Fog index—to measure claim
language complexity.126 As before, the more complex, the higher quality.

Given these metrics, if a “rush to patent” theory—where applicants limit
time and other resource expenditure to hastily apply for patents—is correct, we
should see a measurable decline in each of these measures.
However, we find no significant change in patent quality due to the 1989
Canadian law change using any of these measures.127 For illustration, note

125. This is of course not the only way to define patent quality.
126. For a description of the Flesch-Kincaid index, see J. PETER KINCAID ET AL.,

DERIVATION OF NEW READABILITY FORMULAS (AUTOMATED READABILITY INDEX, FOG
COUNT AND FLESCH READING EASE FORMULA) FOR NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL 18-19, 38-39
(1975) (modifying the Flesch Reading Ease formula to create a new measure of readability
that relates the complexity of the writing to grade level). For the Fog index, see ROBERT
GUNNING, THE TECHNIQUE OF CLEAR WRITING 31-35 (rev. ed. 1968). The advantage of these
measures is that they are standard, require only limited programming to utilize, and are well
understood. The disadvantage is that patent claim language does not adhere to standard conventions of grammar and sentence structure, meaning these metrics are at best useful for
identifying changes in claim language patterns rather than measures of claim complexity directly.
127. We use the same difference-in-difference technique as employed above to examine
the impact on individual inventor share.
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Figures 5 and 6 below, which depict the word count of the first claim of each
granted patent in Canada and the United States, respectively.
FIGURE 5
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What we find, and can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, is a large drop in first
claim word count during the time period of our analysis in U.S. patents. This is
an interesting pattern, and one that suggests further research well beyond the
scope of this project.128 What we can determine here, however, is that the 1989
law change in Canada does not appear to affect patent quality (as measured by
our metrics).
D. Addressing Potential Concerns and Robustness Tests
Although we believe we have identified—at least tentatively—a substantial
effect on individual inventors as a result of the shift to a first-to-file rule, we
have considered several possible confounding factors and limits to the conclusions that we can draw from our analysis. Although we don’t believe that any
of these undermine our basic conclusion, we address them below.
1. The contemporaneous patent term change
Along with the change to the first-to-file system, Canada changed the patent term with the law implemented in 1989. The patent term had been seventeen years from the grant date, and became twenty years from the application
date.129 This change could potentially impact the fraction of individual inventors seeking patents, and therefore could explain the results we find, rather than
the patent priority system. When the United States made the same change in
patent term, the net effect was an increase in patenting,130 so one might think
lengthening the patent term could not account for the decline in the rate of individual patenting observed here. But as Figures 7 and 8 make clear, the processing time in Canada is substantially longer than in the United States. Prior to
the Canadian law change, the processing time was about fifty-one months in
Canada versus twenty-two in the United States. Thus, the net effect of the
change in patent term is to decrease the effective duration of patent protection
and thus decrease the incentive to patent generally.131

128. We believe that this pattern in the U.S. data may be a response by inventors to
changes in U.S. patent law wrought by the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. The consensus is that the Federal Circuit greatly increased the likelihood that patents would be upheld as valid, enabling patentees to seek broader—here, shorter—claims. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA L. REV. 1105,
1116-17 (2004). As we note in the text, this is an avenue for future research.
129. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Relation Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33, § 16 (Can.); Ludlow, supra note 15, at 104.
130. See David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1614, 1642 (2009).
131. See id. at 1622-26 for a discussion of the incentive effects of patent term changes.
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FIGURE 7
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However, this decreased incentive to patent should affect both businesses
and individuals, and it is not clear why the effect would be stronger on individual inventors. If anything, individuals tend to have higher discount rates, and
thus a decrease in duration should make a smaller impact on their decision to
innovate relative to businesses.
Besides the direct effect on the incentive to innovate, the change in processing time could also have heterogeneous effects by patent class.132 It could
be the case that those classes that receive the greatest decrease in effective patent protection are also those with the greatest proportion of individual inventors. To test this, we analyzed the individual inventor share of patents in technology classes, and then checked to see whether that correlated with mean class
pendency—a positive correlation here (more pendency, more individual inventors) might suggest that individual inventors were disproportionately affected
by the patent term change. We did not find this correlation. If anything, we find
that individual inventors tend to be (slightly) overrepresented in classes with
lower pendency. Figures 9 and 10 depict these results graphically, before and
after the shift to first-to-file, respectively.

132. See id. at 1641-42 for an investigation of this phenomenon in the U.S. context.
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FIGURE 9
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2. The introduction of maintenance fees
As noted in Part II above, one of the legal changes introduced in Canada in
1989 (in the same patent reform bill as the shift to first-to-file) was the introduction of maintenance fees, for both applicants and patent grantees.133 In general, these fees require applicants (or grantees) to pay annually to maintain their
applications or their patent rights.134 One possible concern is that the introduction of these fees might reduce patenting behavior, especially for individual inventors. We think this is unlikely for several reasons. First, the amount of fees
is small relative to the total costs of filing a patent for most applicants. We find
that the median processing time (i.e., the time in the patent office) for Canadian
patents filed after October 1, 1989, was 3044 days (or about eight years). For
individual inventors, this time was shorter, at 2274 days. Under the fee schedule, the maintenance fees would have thus added $500—or $250 for individual
inventors—to the total cost of seeking a patent. However, other fees were reduced at the same time—for example, the “final fee” (due upon grant) dropped
from $350 to $150 for small entities, thus almost balancing the impact of the
new maintenance fees.135
More fundamentally, we think that patent office fees, including maintenance fees, are a relatively small portion of overall patenting costs. Note the
contrast, for example, between the maintenance fees and the average of $7000
to $12,000 in attorneys’ fees for filing original patent applications (depending
on complexity and technology).136 Thus, a shift in patent office fees, on the order of $300, should not have substantial impact on the propensity for inventors
to patent their inventions.137

133. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Relation Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33, § 16 (Can.).
134. The annual fee schedule for Canadian patent applications, which has apparently
remained unchanged since 1989, is as follows:
Years 2, 3, 4
Years 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Years 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Years 15, 16, 17, 18, 19

$100
$200
$250
$450

Note that small entities (including individual inventors) pay fifty percent of the listed fees.
See Tariff of Fees—Patents, supra note 54.
135. See id.
136. Compare supra note 134 and accompanying text (detailing maintenance fees), with
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 62, at 25 (detailing typical charges for intellectual property-related legal services).
137. There are other reasons to doubt the effect of patent fees on patent filings generally. For one thing, a national patent office has a monopoly on the ability to grant patent rights.
For another, the substitutes for patent protection—secrecy or unprotected disclosure—are
seriously imperfect substitutes for the rights granted by a patent.
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3. Deferred examination

As noted above, Canada also introduced a deferred examination system in
the 1989 law changes. Deferred examination systems allow patent applicants to
file (thus securing a filing date), and only later request that the patent office
conduct the substantive examination of the application. Typically, there is a
limited window of opportunity in which the applicant can request examination—in Canada, the 1989 law set that window at seven years after the filing,
but in 1992 it was changed to five years.138
The idea behind deferred examination is that it allows for reduced workload on the patent office—many inventors will file applications but not request
examination at all, abandoning the application. At the same time, deferred examination reduces some of the problematic effects of the first-to-file system—
namely, that applicants have strong incentives to file even before their inventions are complete or they have information about commercial viability.
Although we think that deferred examination can account for most of the
large drop in the rate of patenting in Canada shown in Figure 2, in theory, this
change should not have differential effects on patenting behavior across types
of applicants. To the extent that it encourages early filings and additional abandonments before examination, the effect should be an overall reduction in the
grant rate and an increase in pendency at the patent office—both of which we
do see in our data. However, there is the possibility that the introduction of deferred examination would systematically reduce patenting by individual inventors—perhaps individuals are much more likely than firms to abandon their applications before requesting examination—and thus this change could account
for some or all of the effects we observe in the 1989 law change.
To test this possible confounding effect, we conducted a cross-sectional
analysis based on technology classes in Canada and their increase in pendency
as a result of the 1989 law change. If the observed decline in individual inventor share is due to the introduction of deferred examination, we should expect
to see more individual inventors in patent classes where there is more deferred
examination—that is, where pendency is longer. We test this in two ways. First,
for each patent class, we calculate the share of individual inventors and the
pendency in Canada after the 1989 change. Contrary to the deferred examination hypothesis, we find a decreasing relationship between individual inventor
share and pendency.139 We then attempt to control for the possibility of a
preexisting relationship between individual inventor share and patent pendency.
We do so by regressing the change in individual inventor share on the change
in pendency. Here we find no significant relationship between the two
138. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
139. A regression of individual inventor share on pendency yields a coefficient of

-0.0001145 with a standard error of 0.0000245. This means that for an extra 1000 days of
pendency in a patent class, the share of individual inventors will be about 1.1 percentage
points lower.
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variables.140 Overall, the mean pendency time in Canada post-1989 is 6.2 years
for individuals and 7.3 years for corporations.
Contrary to the hypothesis that deferred examination results in lower individual inventorship share, we find no correlation between individual
inventorship share and the increase in pendency resulting from the 1989 law.
Indeed, we find that individual inventorship share correlates with reduced processing time after the 1989 law change, suggesting that, if anything, individual
inventors are not utilizing the deferred examination process as much as firms
are.
There is another way to test the deferred examination hypothesis. Immediately before the 1989 Canadian law change, there was a substantial surge in patenting behavior by individuals. Specifically, in the seven days prior to the October 1, 1989, implementation date, there was a threefold increase in patent
applications as compared to a typical day in 1989 prior to that time—about 300
applications per day as opposed to 88 per day earlier in 1989. That surge of applications was disproportionately comprised of individuals—12.5%, as opposed
to 10.8% for the five years up to that point (and 8.3% after). This is significant
because it suggests that individuals in particular were responding to the priority
rule change (which was mandatory) rather than the deferred examination
change (which is optional). Again, this strongly suggests that changes in individual patenting behavior resulted from the priority rule change rather than deferred examination.
E. Interpretation and Analysis of Our Results
As explained above, we find a significant decline in patenting by individual
inventors relative to larger entities that is caused by the change in Canadian patent law from a first-to-invent to first-to-file priority rule. These results survive
a number of alternative analyses and robustness tests, including investigations
into the other changes that occurred in the same reform of the Canadian patent
laws. In short, we find with some confidence that a shift to first-to-file from
first-to-invent results in a reduction of patenting by individual inventors relative
to firms.
What is less clear from our results is (a) the mechanism by which this occurs—why are individual inventors patenting less?—and (b) the overall welfare
implications. We briefly outline our thoughts on these questions below.

140. The regression of change in individual inventor share in Canada on change in pendency yields a coefficient of -0.0000244 with a standard error of 0.0000181, which is statistically insignificant.
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1. Possible mechanisms

Why do individual inventors patent (relatively) less under a first-to-file regime as opposed to a first-to-invent priority system? Our data cannot answer
that question definitively, but there are several possibilities, which we note in
brief below.
Fewer Resources to Allocate to Patents. As we’ve suggested in Part II
above, a first-to-file priority rule places a premium on speed in completing an
invention, identifying it as patentable, preparing an application, and filing.
Firms will clearly have an advantage in this regard, so perhaps firms will simply win a disproportionate share of the “races” to the patent office. Note that this
theory conflicts to some degree with the results of interference cases in the
United States, where party type does not appear to correlate strongly with success under the first-to-invent rule.141 But given the small number of interferences and highly selected cases, it is difficult to draw much strong evidence
from this source.
Less Invention by Individual Inventors. One possible interpretation of our
results is that the change to first-to-file results in fewer inventions created by
individual inventors, perhaps because of the marginal additional costs required
to be successful patentees in a first-to-file regime. While this may be the case,
there are alternative interpretations, so any conclusions here should be cautious.
Most importantly, patent counts don’t tell the whole story about innovative activity. Inventors can (and do) utilize a number of alternative approaches to protecting themselves in the marketplace, such as trade secrecy and first-mover
advantage. It is possible (and even likely) that if the cost of patenting rises (as a
result of the change to a FTF system), individual inventors in particular will
continue to invent, but shift to alternative methods for protecting their inventions. Therefore, the actual decline in innovative activity by individual inventors is likely to be lower than the decline in patents they are granted.
Demoralization. It’s also possible that individual inventors, after the
change to a first-to-file system, become demoralized or disillusioned with the
patent system, and accordingly seek fewer patents. Perhaps they view the firstto-file rule as unfairly tilted in favor of firms, especially those with resources.
Or perhaps they view the patenting process as increasingly related to luck as a
result of the first-to-file rule. Note that this mechanism suggests that the effect
on individual inventors may be independent of the real impact of the law, and
that theory is consistent with the disproportionate surge of patenting by individual inventors we observe in the several days prior to the implementation of
the first-to-file rule.
Individual Inventors Join Firms. It is possible that we find less patenting
by individual inventors because they joined firms after the implementation of

141. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1320-23; Mossinghoff, supra note 13, at

428.
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the first-to-file rule, and their applications filed after 1989 are characterized as
firm inventions rather than individual inventions. It might be possible to test
this theory empirically, by matching up inventor names across the 1989 law
change, and we note this as an avenue for future research.
Shift to Patenting in the United States. While the impediments to patenting
rose for individuals in Canada, there was no change in U.S. patenting standards.
Thus, one possible explanation of our findings is that individual Canadian inventors chose to forego patenting in Canada and patented in the United States
instead. This hypothesis may be tested by examining only U.S. patent data before and after the Canadian law change.
TABLE 8
Impact on U.S. Patents by Country of Inventor
Variables
After (γ)
Canadian Inventor (β)
After-Canadian Inventor (δ)
Constant (α)

Coefficients & Standard Errors
-0.0124
(0.00113)**
0.0805
(0.00486)**
0.0191
(0.00686)**
0.239
(0.000803)**

Observations
492,784
R-squared
0.162
This regression is restricted to U.S. data in order to investigate the impact of the Canadian law change on patenting behavior of Canadian and U.S. inventors in the United
States. The dependent variable is 1 for patents granted to individual inventors and 0
otherwise; data are at the patent level. “After” indicates that the patents were applied for
subsequent to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of Canadian priority
rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file. IPC class controls are included. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
* indicates significance at p < 0.05
** indicates significance at p < 0.01

Table 8 indicates the results of this investigation. The dependent variable is
the same as Tables 6 and 7, an indicator for whether the patent was granted to
an individual. The key difference in this table (besides the data only including
U.S. patents) is that the regressor of interest is the interaction term between after and Canadian inventor. This indicates the differential effect of the Canadian
law change on the individual inventor share granted to Canadians relative to
Americans in the United States.
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The result is that the share of U.S. patents granted to individual Canadians
rose almost two percentage points relative to the individual American share.142
This is a substantial increase and points to a change in patenting behavior,
whereby individual inventors in Canada may have continued to innovate, but
focused their patenting efforts on the United States. The ability to turn to an alternate patent system will not be open to U.S. inventors, as it was the last major
country to use the FTI priority system.
In short, our data do not provide a clear answer to the question of why the
first-to-file rule yields relatively fewer individual inventors. It does, however,
suggest that individual inventors thought that the change in priority rules was
going to be harmful to them—and filed applications just before the implementation date accordingly. (Note that although the individual inventors’ share was
higher during this surge in applications, firm filings make up the vast majority
of the surge filings.)
2. Welfare implications
Opponents of a change to the first-to-file priority rule often suggest that the
change will harm overall welfare by harming individual inventors (or small
businesses), decreasing patent quality, or both. Our results show that the rule
change does appear to reduce patenting behavior by individuals—though as
noted above in Subpart III.E, we cannot determine why—but that it does not
appear to negatively affect patent quality (at least on some metrics of patent
quality).
What, then, are the overall welfare implications of our findings? We urge
caution. While we are confident that we’ve identified a real effect on patenting
behavior by individuals as a result of the shift to first-to-file, there is nothing in
our results that suggests that this has resulted in less invention overall. That
said, if one felt strongly that individual inventors are uniquely productive or
unusually likely to create socially valuable innovations, then one might interpret our findings as showing negative welfare effects from the first-to-file rule.
Another caveat, as outlined above: we can’t rule out that more individual inventors either join firms or utilize alternative protection mechanisms.
Further, even if the decrease in individual inventor share of patenting was
understood to be a welfare loss, the first-to-file rule might nonetheless be a net
benefit to society—by virtue of reducing the complexity and administrative
costs associated with the first-to-invent rule. That is, the savings from the reduction in administrative costs might well outweigh any losses associated with
the reduction in patenting behavior by individual inventors.
What we can say with some confidence is that the change to a first-to-file
rule must indeed have welfare implications. The former first-to-invent rule was
142. The regression reported includes IPC technology class controls. Other specifications, including year dummies, time trends, or no controls yield similar results.
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costly and complex, so its elimination will have a substantial impact. Further,
our point estimate suggests perhaps a fourteen-percent reduction in the share of
individual inventors receiving patents as a result of the first-to-file rule.143 Together, these two changes will have, we think, an impact on innovation and social welfare, though the direction and magnitude is unknown. Indeed, the difficult—and potentially uncomfortable—question for supporters of the America
Invents Act raised by our study is how much individual inventors’ share of patenting should weigh on our patent policy decisions.
CONCLUSION
When President Obama argued that the America Invents Act would simplify the U.S. patent system, “cut[ting] the red tape that stops too many inventors
and entrepreneurs from quickly turning new ideas into thriving businesses,
which holds our whole economy back,”144 he was almost surely alluding (at
least in part) to the change from first-to-invent to first-to-file. As we’ve shown,
this change will surely simplify and streamline the U.S. patent system—but at a
cost. Whether the reduction in individual patenting translates into a net reduction in innovation—or if it does, whether that loss is offset by the simplification
of the priority rules—is a question we cannot answer, but which obviously calls
for further study.
Notwithstanding the images of Edison, Hewlett and Packard, Jobs and
Wozniak, how much do individual inventors matter to American innovation?
That, we think, is the critical question suggested by our study. To date, most
observers seem to have assumed that our shift to the FTF rule, though a substantial change in U.S. patent law practice, will have little impact on who seeks
and receives patents. We demonstrate that this is wrong. The change to the
first-to-file rule in the United States will likely result in a reduction of individual inventors’ share of patents. Thus, the cost savings yielded by the priority
rules changes in the America Invents Act will not, we suggest, be free.

143. See supra Part III.B. In Table 6, the coefficient for the base specification is
-0.0149. That represents a 1.49 percentage point reduction in the share granted to individuals
in Canada relative to the share the law change. Because the pre-law change rate was about
10.8%, that in turn suggests about a 14% drop in relative share. (The ratio of 1.49% to 10.8%
is about 14%.)
144. Remarks on the Federal Budget, supra note 6.
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